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THE RULE IN SHELLY'S CASE IN THE LAST
DUODECENNIUM.

T

HE purpose of this paper is to exhibit the development
of the rule in Shelly's case, in the decisions of the appellate courts during the last dozen years.
THE MERITS OF THE RULE.

In 1850' C.J. Gibson somewhat emphatically defended the
rule. "Though of feudal origin," he observed, "it is not a
relic of barbarism, or a part of the rubbish of the dark ages."
It unfetters estates, by vesting the inheritance in the ancestor,
and making it alienable a generation sooner than it would otherwise be. By turning a life estate, with remainder to heirs of
the body, into an estate tail, it is the hand-maid not only of
Taltarum's case,' but of our statutes for barring entails by a deed.
Where the limitation over after the life estate, is to heirs general, it cuts off what would otherwise be a contingent remainder, destructible only by a common recovery. The justice
alarms us by saying "The rule is too intimately connected with
the doctrine of estates, to be separated from it without breaking
the ligaments of property."
As if the support of the Chief Justice were an answer to all objections, Porter, J., in 1900, 3 observed, "Chief Justice Gibson did not deem it unworthy of him
'Hileman v. Bouslaugh, 13 Pa 344.
2Which decided in 1473 that heirs in an estate tail might be barred by
a common recovery suffered by the donee in tail. Minor and Wurts, Real
Prop. p. 157.
3McGregor v. Davidson, 14 Super, 230; Cf. Sheeley v. Neidhammer,
182 Pa. 163; Peirce v. Hnbbard, 10 C. C. 63.
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to vindicate it against its critics, in his day. It would seem to
be in harmony with the institutions of a people who have insisted that land shall be freely alienable, and an asset for the
payment of debts, condemned perpetuities, and made impossible
the creation of estates tail."
These defences would be more
forcible, if it was the policy of the state to prohibit life estates,
or contingent remainders. These are both permitted, and the
rule in Shellv-'s Case simply prevents the formation of them
when the takers of the remainder are intended to be exactly the
same persons that would take, by inheritance, if the grantee or
devisee for life, had instead of a life estate, a fee.
WHAT IS THE RULE?

There is a certain variableness in the statement of the rule.
Williams represents it as being thus: "When the ancestor, by
any gift or conveyance, takes an estate of freehold, and, in the
same gift or conveyance an estate is limited, either mediately or
immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail, the words 'the heirs'
are words of limitation of the estate of the ancestor. The heir,
if he should take any interest, must take as heir by descent
from his ancestor; for he is not constituted by the words of the
gift or conve3 ance, a purchaserof any separate gnd independent
estate for himself."" "As the rule has a double aspect," says
Lowrie, J., "we may divide it into two. Then the first one may
be thus expressed. A devise to one for life, with remainder to
his heirs, creates a fee simple. The law so treats it because it
is substantially so and sets aside the apparent [it is not an apparent only, but a real] intention to make two estates out of it.
And the second one may be thus expressed. A devise to one
for life with remainder to the heirs general or special of his
body creates a fee tail, general or special. It is substantially a
fee tail, and so the law treats it, notwithstanding the form in
which the devise is expressed."'
White, J., expresses the rule
thus: "When by deed or will an estate in land is given to one
for life, and at his death the remainder to his heirs in fee, the
estate of the life tenant is enlarged to a fee, the two estates are
merged in one, and the first taker takes the whole. '"
'Real Property (17tl Ed.) p. 322; Simpson v. Reed, 205 Pa. 53.
5
Price v. Taylor. 28 Pa. 95.
'Carson v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. 256.
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FIRST ESTATE A FREEHOLD.

The estate given to the first taker, the ancestor of the remaindermen, must be a freehold. It is usually an estate for
his own life. It may be an estate per autre vie. It may be a
life estate subject to defeasance before death. It might at common law be a fee tail. But "the rule has no application if the estate limited to the ancestor be less than freehold, as an estate for
years."' What then did Dean, J., mean when he said"' Of course
the estate of the first taker must be a freehold estate for life or
for years?" An estate for years is not a freehold. There must
be a freehold estate preceding the estate to the heirs. The
court was unable to apply the Rule therefore, to a deed which,
in its premises, described the grantee as a married woman and
her heirs by S. West, her present husband, and which conveyed the land to them, their heirs and assigns9 because there
purported to be created by it no succession of estates; no life
estate in Mrs. West, and a succeeding estate in her heirs. A
devise of the use of a farm," of the proceeds or interest," of the
use and occupancy of a farm," for life, is a devise of a life estate
in the farm.
THE REMAINDERBIEN.

What purports to be a remainder after the life estate, must
be given to whatever person or persons would inherit the land
if the donee for life had a fee, and if he died intestate, seised of
it. A gift over to persons who, in some circumstances would
inherit, but, in others, would not, would not satisfy this principle. If children survive a man, and no issue of deceased
children, the children will be his heirs; but the children may
die, leaving children. In that case, the gift over to children
would not be to such persons as would inherit had the life tenant been seised of a fee. The persons able to take the remain7

Tiffany, Real Prop. p. 311.

8

Simpson v. Reed, 205 Pa. 53, quoted by the Court below in Schre-

congost v. West, 210 Pa. 7.
OSchregongost v. West, 210 Pa. 7. It was held however, to convey
to Mrs. West in special tail, i. e. to her and the heirs of her body by her

present husband, which by the act of April 27th, 1855, became a fee
simple.
"0Stiger v. Dinsmore, 193 Pa. 482.
"'Vilsack's Estate, 207 Pa. 611.
'2Armstrong v. Michener, 160 Pa. 21.
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der under the terms of the deed or will must be such as in any
set of circumstances, would be the heirs, if the life-tenant had
had a fee, when he died, intestate. This is what is meant, apparently by the declaration that the limitation over. in order-to
fall within the rule in Shelly's case, "must be to the heirs in
fee or in tail, as a nomen collectivum for the whole line of inheritable blood. " " The point of time when the remainder is to take
effect, is of course the death of the first taker. Such person as
then would b3 entitled if the intestate law was applicable, that
is, if the land were desce.zding-from the life tenant, must be the
persons entitled under the phrase of the deed or will.
INTENTION THAT REMAINDERMEN SHOULD INHERIT.

It is frequently said that the creator of the estate, whether
grantor or testator, must intend that the remaindermen should
take as heirs from the first taker. Strong, J., inquires in
Physick's Appeal" "How did the donor or testator intend the
remaindermen to take? If as heirs in this state, they take distributively, and therefore the directions that the remainder
shall be divided among the right heirs is not repugnant to the
Says Mitchell, J., "In
intent that they shall take by descent."
determiningf whether the rule in Shelly's case is applicable, the
test is how the donees in remainder are to take; [meaning how
the testator intends them to take.] If as purchasers under the
donor then the particular estate is limited by the literal words
of the deed, and the rule in Shelley's Case has no application.
But, if the remaindermen are to take [are intended to take] as
heirs to the donee of the particular estate, then what has been
called the superior intent as declared in Shelley's case. oper' 3Kuntzleman's Estate, 136 Pa. 152.
1"50 Pa. 128. The statement in Hargrave's Lav7 Tracts 563, quoted
by Shippen, J., in Baughman v. Baughman, 2 Y, 410; is "nothing less
than evidence of intending by a remainder to the heirs general or special
of a preceding tenant for life not to include a succession of heirs, but
msrely to design a certain person or persons answering that description
at pne particular instant of time namely the death of the tenant for life,
can suffice to exempt such a remainder from the operation of the rule."
But, the remainder could not be a remainder unless it was designed to
take effect at the close precisely, of the particular estate. Only those
who are then heirs or issue can be intended to take. Such intention not
only does not preclude the operation of the Rule in Shelly's Case but on
the contrary is presupposed by such Rule, where no estate is inserted
between the life estate given to A and the remainder given to his heirs.
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ates and the first donee takes a fee, whatever words may be
used in describing the estate given to him?"' 5 The remainder
must be given to heirs, "as heirs""' qua heirs."' 1 The intent
must be, that the remaindermen should take not from the testator, but from the first devisee. 8 A little reflection is sufficient
to show the erroneousness of these- statements. The testator
intends the first taker, to take only a life estate. He may say
so expressly. He makes the ulterior limitation to operate at the
death of the first taker, showing that he conceives the estate already given to him then to come to an end. If then, lie gives
to X a life estate, an estate he intends to terminate with X's
death, how can he intend that any body shall inherit from him,
that any estate shall descend from him? It is vain to limit the
Rule to the case in which the intention that there shall be an
inheritance, is manifest. The rule would then be unnecessary.
The principle that the deed or will is to be carried out in the
sense in which it was intended to operate by the parties to the
former, by the testator of the latter, would compel the construction under which a fee would pass. The rule in Shelley's case
would not have needed to be invented. When the grantor or
testator divides the integral estate into two sections giving one
to one, and the other to another or others, it is idle to say that
he intends the latter to take only that which he has given to the
former, from the former. Nothing remains of that which is
given to the former, when he dies, and nothing then can in the
thought of the settler, pass from him to the others. In Shapley
v. Diehl," after saying that the Rule applies only when the remaindermen are to take as heirs from the particular tenant,
Mitchell, J., says "it is argued that this construction defeats
the filainly expressed intent that the first grantee should take
only a life estate. But the rule in Shelley's case," he replies,
"is a rule of law, not of construction, and where a case falls
15Shapley v. Diehl, 203 Pa. 566.
"6Guthries' Appeal, 37 Pa. 9.
"Doebler's Appeal, 69 Pa. 9; Breinig v. Oldt, 45 Super, 629; Kemp
v. Reinhard, 228 Pa. 143.
18Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa. 515; Haldeman v. Haldeman, 40 Pa. 29;
Brinton v. Martin, 197 Pa. 615.
19203 Pa. 566. Quoted by himself in Belcher's Estate, 211 Pa. 615.
In Shalters v. Ladd, 141 Pa. 349, it is apparently said that the purpose of
the testator that the remaindermen should take by purchase is decisive.
But that is the very purpose which the Rule in Shelley's case nullifies.
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wlthin it, it applies inexorably without reference to intent."
But, he' has already said that the rule does not apply unless
there is an intent that the remaindermen take as heirs. How
can there be such an intent, in the mind of a testator who knows
that a life estate ends with death, and that nothing remains of
it, after death, to pass to anybody?
DEFEATS THE INTENTION OF TESTATOR.

If the Rule operates only when the testator or settler has
intended the remaindermen to take qua heirs, as heirs, by descent from the ancestor, and not by purchase from the testator
or settler, how is the complaint true that the Rule violates and
defeats the intention of the deed or will? "It is admitted,"
says Gibson, C. J., "that the rule subverts a particular intention in, perhaps, every instance, for as was said in Roe v. Bedford, 4 Maule & Selw. 363, it is proof against even an express
declaration that the heirs shall take as purchasers."2 "Even if
he [the testator] expressly provides that the rule shall not apply, [i. e., that the issue or heirs named to take the remainder,
shall take it as a remainder, that is by purchase from the testator, and not by inheritance from the first devisee] that the ancestor shall be tenant for life only, 2' and impeachable for waste,
if he interpose an estate in trustees to support contingent remainders-or, as in this will, declare in so many words that he
'shall in nowise sell or alienate, as it is intended that he shall
have a life estate only' it will be all ineffectual to prevent the
operation of the rule.' "2 The testator intends that the first devisee shall have only a life estate, shall have no power to defeat
the succession of those who are named to follow him; he intends
that these shall have the remainder, despite the will of the
earlier devisee. Yet the rule defeats his intention. The intention that the successors shall take as p~urchasers is inconsistent
with the intention that they should take from the first devisee
as heir. It is evident then, that the rule does not wait to operate, until it appears that the testator intended the successors to
2OHileman v. Bouslaugh, 13 Pa. 344; Simpson v. Reed, 205 Pa. 53;
Shapley v. Diehl, 203 Pa. 566; Breinig v. Oldt, 45 Super. 629; McGregor

v. Davidson, 14 Super. 230.
2
1Though "the intention was to give a life estate only," said the
court, "the rule in Shelley's case applies to the devise." Stayman v.
Paxson, 221 Pa. 446; Cf. Kemp v. Reinhard, 228 Pa. 143.
22
Doebler's Appeal, 64 Pa. 9, 17; Cf. Bassett v. Moore, 118 Pa. 94.
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take a heirs. It operates despite the intention that they shall
take as purchasers. When A gives B a life estate, and the remainder to C,it is he that is giving the remainder. He intends
C to take the remainder from him. If instead of giving the remander to C, a determinate person, he gives it to an indeterminate person, e. g. to such person as shall be the issue or heirs of
B, at B's death, it is equally clear that he intends these issue or
heirs to take from him and not from B who has nothing to give.
What the rule forbids is that the same persons that would be
heirs of the life devisee or grantee should be selected to take a
remainder, even if they were intended to take the remainder,
qua remainder, and therefore from the testator. The object of
the law would be circumvented, in forbidding restraints on
alienation, if land could be given to the person intended first to
rec-ive it, for his life, with remainder to the very same persons
that would be his heir . The succession by these persons would
be secured from prevention by the artifice of giving to their
predecessor, only a life estate. The successi6n would be secured, by the testator's or grantor's limitation.
REMAINDERMEN

MUST BE HEIRS OF THE LIFE TENANT.

The gift in fee must be to the heirs general or special, of
the life-tenant. This principle required the refusal to apply
the Rule in Shelley's Case in Belcher's Estate.'3 The devise
was to the testator's parents, brothers and sisters, until the
death of the last survivor of them, the income from the property to be paid to them, or to the issue of any of them who died
before the last survivor, such issue taking the parents' share.
If any of the life-tenants should die without issue, the whole
income was to be distributed among the survivors and the issue
of such as had died, leaving issue. After the death of the last
survivor of the brothers and sisters. the estate was to descend to
the issue of any brothers and sisters who might then be living,
share and share alike in fee. "When such survivor died" says
Mitchell, C. J., "the issue then living of all the brothers and
sisters took a fee, not in succession to their parents per stirpes,
but per capita in their own right, directly from the testator.
The testator gave life estates in severalty with no limitation
over in fee to the heirs of any one, but with a contingent remainder in fee to such issue of the life tenants collectively, as
2211

Pa. 615.
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should be living at the death of the last life tenant."
If, e. g.,
there were four brothers and sisters, A, B, C, and D, A might
have died, leaving no issue; B, leaving one son; C, leaving
five sons; D, the last to die, may have left no issue. Then the
fee would be taken, per capita, by B's son and C's sons. The
fee was then not given to the issue of the person to whom the
life estates were given. In A's undivided fourth, his issue was
not given the fee.
THE WORD HEIRS.

If the second estate is limited to the heirs of the first taker,
this word will, in the absence of controlling words or directions
in the will, be taken to mean, the persons, who, at the death of
the first taker, shall be designated by the law, under the then
existing conditions, to be heirs of the first taker, with respect to
any inheritable lands of which he shall die seised, intestate. A
devise to D, "so long as he shall live, and to his legal heirs, if
he have any at his death"; "if he have no legal heirs at his
death, then to my grandchildren," A, B, and C. D had no
children when the will was made. Nothing in the will indicated that heirs was used in the sense of children; i. e. a limited
class of heirs. D took a fee."' Devise of the use and income
of land to William, a son, during his life. On his death the
land "shall descend to and the title thereof shall at once vest in
his heirs at law. William takes a fee.'
Conveyance to A in
trust for the use of B during her life and at her decease, then to
her heirs in fee, share and share alike. The trust being dry, B
takes a fee."
"I give to V. H. during her lifetime and the
heirs of her body at her decease, all my real estate, and in case
of her or her children dying without living issue," the land is
to go to the Board of Home Missions. V. H. takes a fee, children in the last part of the clause is equivalent to heirs of the
body.
Gift of use of farm to C during his life, and to his heirs
to the third generation the same use; then the property to be
sold and divided among the heirs of C. C takes a fee. The attempted restraint of alienation for three generations is void.'
24

Bassett v. Hawk, 118 Pa. 94. There was a gift over, in case there
were no "heirs" to nieces (who are heirs).
25SMarsh v. Platt, 221 Pa. 431.
26
Carson
2

v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. 256.
1Hastings v. Engle, 217 Pa. 419.

2Stigers v. Dinsmore, 193 Pa. 482.
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Gift after the death or marriage of the widow, "to my legal
heir during his natural life, and after his death to his heirs and
assigns forever." The testator left one child, a son. The son,
meant by the "legal heir," took a fee.'
Gift to T of two tracts.
"The two tracts so bequeathed shall be during the natural life
of my son T, and after his death, to his heirs and legal representatives in fee simple," except the dower interest of the testator's widow. T received a fee.' Gift to M. In the event of
her dying without heirs, then to S. M had a fee."' Gift of a
"life-time lease," i. e. of a life estate. "It cannot be taken from
you. You cannot spend it. At your decease, if you have lawful heirs, then all will fall to them," if not, the house to be sold,
and the proceeds distributed. The recipient of the "lifetime
lease" took a fee. 3' The son took a fee by these words, "I
give to my son and his heirs after him all my real estate," 33 and
by these, "I bequeath" to G all my estate, real, personal and
mixed * * * to hold the same during his natural life, and
after that to his legal heirs, to do with it as they see proper.' 3'
INTESTATE LAW EXPRESSLY REFERRED TO.

The devise over may refer to the intestate law to define
those who are to take under it. A devise to M, of land to be
used, occupied and enjoyed by her during the term of her natural life, and at her death, I do order and direct that the same
shall pass and descend to her heirs and next of kin in the same
manner as though she had been seised thereof in her lifetime in
fee simple, and unmarried and had died intestate. The word
"heirs" alone, the following phrase alone, would have sufficed
to give M a fee.""
nReutter v. McCall, 192 Pa. 77.
3

°Shoup v. DeLong, 190 Pa. 331.
Elliott, 23 Super. 449.

A gift over to the heirs or heirs
of the body of the life-tenant, without further limitation or description is
conclusive that they are to take by inheritance. Breinig v. Oldt, 45
Super. 629.
3'Corvin v.

32
MeCann
3

v. Barclay, 204 Pa. 214.
Nesbit v. Skelding, 213 Pa. 486.
3
Garver v. Clouser, 218 Pa. 611.
35Serfass v. Serfass, 190 Pa. 484.
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ISSUE.

In wills, the word issue means prima facie, heir- of the
body, and it is a word of limitation." Devise to three grand
ch'ldren of a farm, "from which they will receive the income
after the death of my wife [their grandmother] and at their
death it will descend to their issue." Though the intention
was to give a life estate only, the rule in Shelley's case applies
to the devise."
A gift of the use and occupancy of land to A
for his life and then to his issue, if he have any, givesa fee tail,
converted by the act of 1855 into a fee simple.' A devise to H
daring her natural life, to her sole and separate use, to the exclusion of her husband, and immediately after her death to the
la rful issue of H, would give her a fee, if the sole and- separat: use terminated before her death, unless there was something
in the will compelling a different conclusion, e. g., something
showing that particular issue only, was intended. s'
WHEN ISSUE IS A WORD OF PURCHASE.

The word issue may be used, not as a word of limitation
but of purchase. It may be used to describe some particular
issue, e. g. of the first, or second, or third generation. In such
case, issue not of the sub-class intended, could not take under
the gift to issue. A gift was made by will to Kate, John, and
William, of all the testator's real estate, to hold as tenants
in common for their natural lives, and the life of the survivor,
with remainder in fee to their issue, the issue taking per stirpes
and not per capita, so that on the death of any one of the first
three devisees, leaving issue, such issue shall take what their
parent would have been entitled to, subject to the life estate of
the survivor or survivors of the three. The court thought' that
issue meant children, a particular class of issue which is to take
at a particular time and that the three primary devisees took
life estates only. It thought this because the issue is directed
to take per stirpes, and to take subject to the life estate of the
survivors of the three first devisees. The issue are to take
36
Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. 74; Bright v. Esterly, 199 Pa. 88; Stayman v. Paxson, 221 Pa. 446; O'Rourke v. Sherwin, 156 Pa. 285; Hill v.
Giles, 201 Pa. 215.
3
'Stayman v. Paxson, 221 Pa. 446.
38
Armstrong v. Mishoner, 160 Pa. 21.
39Shalters v. Ladd, 141 Pa. 349.
40 0'Rourke v. Sherwin, 156 Pa. 285.
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not immediately upon the death of their ancestor but only
afier the death of the last survivor of the three ancestors.
This last fact alone, could, apparently have no significance.
for the rule in Shelley's case applies even when an estate
is inserted between the life estate given to A, and the remainder to the heirs of issue of A." As, in every case, the issue or
heir who is intended to take, must be such as is living at the
termination of the particular estate, the rule in Shelley's case
would be simply annulled. if the principle were consistently applied that the intention. to lodge the remainder in such heirs or
issue as are alive at the particular time when the preceding
estate closes, precludes its application. The provision that the
issue of each of the three life tenants should take per stirpes, is
explained by the will itself to mean that the issue of each of the
three should take only what his deceased parent has a life estate in.
This is precisely what occurs in every case in which
the Rule in Shelley's Case is invoked. A life estate in a certain tract, or in an undivided interest in that tract, is given to
A for life; remainder to his heirs or issue. The heirs take,
of course, only the tract or the interest, in which A had the life
estate. In Hill v. Giles' the testator gave his niece his farm,
during his natural life; "and at her decease, this portion shall
be inherited by the surviving issue" of the niece, "'share and
share alike."
The court below says that evidently the "surviving issue" means the descendants of the niece "at a particular time, that is at the time of her death. This, together with
the direction for distribution in equal shares among such descendants, would seem, under the cases, to be sufficient to indicate that the word issue * * * is not a word of limitation
but of purchase."
We have already suggested that in every
case, when A devises land to B for his life, remainder to his heirs,
he must mean that those who are the heirs at B's death, shall
take the land. The direction that the issue shall take per capita; i. e. "share and share alike," is inconsistent in some cases,
with the provision of the intestate law. If the issue are of unequal degrees of propinquity to the deceased, the principle of
representation has place. The testator's rule precludes inheritance, in every imaginable case, according to the intestate law,
4Tiffany Real Prop. p. 310; Williams Real Prop. (17th Edit) p. 320.
41201 Pa. 215.
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and for this reason only, it may be held that the rule in Shelley's
case does not apply.
In Olivers' Estate 3 the will gave the real property to the
widow for life. At her death it directed a division of it, Robert
taking one half, and three other children taking together, the
other half. In case any of these children should die before the
division, i. e., before the death of the widow, leaving issue,
such issue was to receive the parent's share. If any child thus
dying left no issue, his interest was to be equally-divided aniong
the other children then living, share and share alike. Robert
died before the widow; and without issue. It was held that he;
had no inheritable interest; but that the other children took
share and share alike, under the will. Whether the rule in
Shelley's case was applicable or not, is not distinetly discussed,
nor was it necessary, for even if it applied, and even if a fee
vested in Robert, it was divested by his death without issue
within the life of the widow. The will provided for its defeat
on a definite failure of issue.
KEMP V. REINHARD.

It is here convenient t6 consider Kemp v. Reinhard."' The
testatrix gave to her son Jacob, "the use and income for and
during his lifetime" of certain tracts. Immediately after the
decease of Jacob "I give and devise" the above named tracts,
"devised to him herein for life, to his issue in fee. Should he
die without leaving issue living, I give and devise the same unto
my son Pierce, his heirs and assigns in fee."
The question
was, was Jacob able to pass to his vendee a marketable title in
fee. Whether the will was written since the act of 1897 with
respect to words importing failure of issue, does not appear.
It is apparent however, that the failure meant, is a failure at
the death of Jacob. His estate therefore is subject to a valid
executory devise over, and even if he took a fee under the rule
in Shelley's case his vendee could not get a secure title. This
view however, is not considered. The sole question, the court
thinks, is did Jacob take a fee under, the Rule? The court concludes that Jacob had only a life estate. The reasons are remarkable. (a) The testator intended that he should have a life
estate and "nothing more." The intention is clearly and
4199 Pa. 509.
44228 Pa. 143.
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thrice expressed. But, we have seen that the intention that the
first taker shall have only a life estate is precisely the intention
that the rule in Shelley's case over-rides. (b) "But," says the
court, "what defeats the application of the rule in Shelley's case is
the unmistakable intention of the testatrix, not only that Jacob
was to get only a life estate, but that after his death, the remainder should not pass by devolution from him to his heirs, but directly from her to a designated class or to a designated individual." The designated class is "his issue in fee. " If the gift over
to "issue in fee," indicates that the issue is to take from the
testator, and not from the life-tenant, and this intention precludes the application of the Rule, the Rule is nothing but a
phrase. In every case, the grantor or testator intends to give
a life estate to A. In every case he intends to give a remainder
to A's issue or heirs. There is not a single feature by which
the Kemp devise can be differenced from any other devise which
has been held to fall within the Rule. The intent attributed to
the testatrix by the court, is, firstly, to give Jacob a life estate
only; and secondly, to give a remainder, to the issue; a remainder of course, which came from her, and which was to be enjoyed by the issue. 5
45That the issue or heirs are defined as "then living," i. e., at the
death of the life-tenant, does not exclude the Rule. Criswell's Appeal,
41 Pa. 288; Appeal of Cockins, 111 Pa. 26; Hiester v. Yerger, 166 Pa. 445;
Grimes v. Shizk, 169 Pa. 74.
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MOOT COURT
RUPP v. RUPP.
Exclusion of Parents from Sharing Fund Recovered by Widow for
Death of Husband.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Rupp was killed as a result of the negligence of the X. R. R. Co.
He was survived by a widow and an aged mother. He was earning $5,000
a year and saved nothing. He was accustomed to give his mother $100
a month. His wife had a fortune in her own right but brought action
against the R. R. Company and recovered $10,000. The mother was in
destitute circumstances and her son left no estate. This is a bill in
equity to compel the widow to share the $10,000. The mother was living
with her son at the time of his death.
McCall for Plaintiff.
Saul for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SCOTT, J.-Under the Act of 1851 the right of action was given to
the widow and if the deceased left no widow then to the personal representatives. This was followed by the Act of 1855, which provides that
the persons entitled to recover damages shall be the husband, widow,
children or parents of the deceased and no other relatives and the sum
recovered shall go to them in proportion they would take his or her persdnal estate in case of intestacy. This act has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of R. R. Co. v. Dicker, 84
Pa. 419 to mean that, if the deceased leaves a husband the right of action survives in him alone, and if a wife, survives in her alone; if there
be neither husband nor widow the right survives in the -children and so on
down the line. This rule has been followed in R. R. Co. 204 Pa. 229 and
numerous other cases. Therefore, we would say that the right ot action
was in this case in the widow and the widow only.
The widow having brought suit and recovered, the question arises as
to whether she is entitled to the whole of the amount recovered or must
a share be turned over by her to the destitute mother of the deceased.
After naming the persons by whom suit may be brought, the Act of 1855
goes on to say, "the sum recovered shall go to them in proportion they
would take his or her personal estate under the intestate laws." A
strict interpretation of this statute would lead us to believe that the
mother was entitled to the portion assigned to her by the intestate law
and that the widow could not retain the full amount owned by her. In
Buch v. Railway, 179 Pa. 339, Justice Sterrett says, "while the right of
action is given according to the circumstacces of each case to one of the
four designated parties, it is clear from the wording of the act that the
entire sum recovered is not always to be retained by the plaintiff in his
or her own right. It is to be distributed among the relatives named as
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in the proportion they would be entitled to take his or her personalty under the intestate law." The same statement is made in 84 Pa. 419, 17
Sup. 229.
It is contended on the part of the defendant that the case of Lehigh
Iron Co. v. Rupp is doubly in point and that the law, as laid down in that
case, is such as to prevent a recovery by the mother. In that case the
father of a minor child, who was killed by the negligence of the defendant Company, brought an action againstthe Company, the widow of the
deceased being alive. Therein the case of Rupp v. The Lehigh Iron Co.
differs from the case at bar. This is a bill in equity asking an accounting and not an action against the compapy. The mother in this case
might not have had an action against the railroad company under the
statute of 1855, but the decision in Rupp v. the Iron Co. can have no bearing on the question of the distribution of the damages after they are obtained by an action by the proper person.
In the case of Lewis v. Turnpike Co., 203 Pa. 511, it was held by
Mitchell, C. J., that the widow, having recowred a judgment, adult
children having severed the family relations with the deceased, were not
entitled to a share of the judgment. This case was decided on the
ground that the family relations had been severed. In the case at bar
the mother lived at the home of the deceased and received from him the
regular allowance of $100 per month for her support. She had an expectancy of support from her son. It is well settled in Pennsylvania that a
r7ight of action is in persons having a reasonable expectation of pecuniary
advantage from the deceased. C. R. R. v. Adams, 55 Pa., 469; R. R. v.
Kellar, 67 Pa. 300; R. R. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 15. Had there been no widow,
the mother would undoubtedly have received substantial damages. It
has been held that the right of action is based on the family relations
existing at the death of the deceased. 55 Pa. 499.
We are convinced that the relation existing between the mother and
son was sufficient to entitle her to a share under the intestate law.
The question arises as to whether a bill in equity for an accounting
was the proper mode of procedure in this case. It has been so held in
Lewis v. Turnpike Co., 203 Pa. 511, and in Allen v. Powers, 179 Pa. 531.
There is but one more question to pass upon and that is the mother's
share. By the Act of April the first, 1909, P. L. 88, when a widow survives her husband without issue she receives the first $5,000 absolutely,
her $300 exemption and one half of all personalty over and above that
amount making the widow's share in this case $7,550 and leaving as the
mother's share $2,350.
Decree for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
It has been held that where the deceased is survived by a widow and
children, the children are entitled to share in the amount recovered as
the value of the deceased's life. It has also been held that where children and parents survive, the parents are entitled to share in the amounts
recovered. In each of these cases the distribution is made in accordance with the provisions of the intestate law.
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The learned court below now holds that where a widow and parents
survive, the parents are entitled to share in the recovery. This position
seems justified by the terms of the act of 1855 and harmonizes with the
rulings made in the other cases. The right to recover for death by
wrongful act is entirely dependent upon statutory provisions and these
statutory provisions alone should be considered in determining the extent
and nature of the right. There is nothing in the act of 1855 to indicate
that the widow should take to the exclusion of the parents save the fact
that her name precedes that of the parents in the statute. It also precedes that of children, nevertheless the children are entitled to share
with the widow.
Opposed to the conclusion of the learned court below is Lehigh Iron
Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. 95. An attempt is made to distinguish this case
from the case at bar on the ground that in the former the parent
brought the action, and in the latter the parent simply seeks to share in
the amount recovered in an action brought by the widow. This becomes
a distinction without a difference when we learn that the court decided
that the parent could not bring the action because he was not entitled to
share in the amounts recovered.
The confusion which would result in applying the rule asserted by
the learned court below is graphically described in Lehigh Iron v. Rupp,
and if we were called to decide what ouyht to be the law, we would undoubtedly adopt the opinion of Justice Trunkey. In deciding what is the
law we still follow this dacision but with the comment that we regard it
as a remarkable piece of judicial legislation.
Decree of the court below granting the bill is reversed.

HAMILTON AD'M'R. v. STODDARD.
Liability of Vendor for Acts of Vendee Resulting from Illegal
Sale of Liquors-Contributory Negligence-Proximate
Cause-Survival of Actions
Wallace for Plaintiff.
Shaeffer for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
EVANS, J.-The defendant is a dealer in liquor. On July 3rd, 1910,
he sold liquor to one Jackson, when the latter was visibly intoxicated,
The next day Jackson, while drunk, killed the child of Hamilton by
driving over him, while at play in the street. The child was seven years
old. Hamilton was nearby and knew the child was in the street at the
time. Suit was begun in the child's lifetime in its name. The father
has since been substituted as its administrator. He will be the only
distributee.
This is an action of trespass, to recover damages for injuries to a
child, alleged to have been caused by the act of the defendant, in furnishing liquor to Jackson, while he was visibly intoxicated.
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The case presents numerous questions: First, what is the defendant's reslonsibility under the acts of May 8, 1854, and the act of 1887?
Second, can the father be substituted in this action, which was commenced in the child's name? Third, the question of proximate cause
of the accident, and, lastly, the question of contributory negligence, on
the part of the plaintiff.
The act of May 8, 1854, provides: "That any person furnishing intoxicating liquor to any other person, in violation of any existing law, or
the provisions of this act, shall be held civily responsible for any injury
to person, or property, in consequence of such furnishing, and any one
aggrieved may recover full damages as against such person."
Another
section of this act provides: "It is a misdemeanor to wilfully furnish intoxicating drinks to any person when visibly intoxicated."
The statute of 1887 gives every wife, child, parent, guardian, husband, or other person a right of action against a liquor seller for any injuries done the plaintiff by reason of intoxication of any person. In view
of those statutes it is clear that the child had a right of action, and that
right against the liquor seller,
Let us consider the second question. Can the father be substituted
in this action which was commencad in the child's name? The act of
April 15, 1851, provides: "That no action hereafter brought to recover
damages for injuries to the person by negligence, or default shall abate
by reason of the death of the plaintiff; but the personal representative
of the deceased may be substituted and prosecute to final judgment and
satisfaction"; and in Stern v. G. C. Ry. Co. 1, W. N. C. 531, it was held,
"The right of action vests in the father when his minor son has died
through negligence."
It is so well settled in Pennsylvania that we will
not longer dwell on the subject; but say that the father has a right to be
substituted.
The third question to be decided is: Was the furnishing of liquor by
the defendant the proximate cause of the accident? In Roach v. Kelly,
194 Pa. 24, it was held: "A man is answerable for the consequences of
a fault only so far as the same are natural, and proximate, and may,
on this account, be foreseen by ordinary forecast, and not those which
arise from a conjunction of his fault with other circumstances of an extraordinary nature." Bradford v. Boley, 167 Pa. 506.
The Court in Davis v. McKnight; 146 Pa., 610, said: ':It is not easy
in a case, to trace with absolnte certainty the death to its proximate
cause; but the liquor was undoubtedly the proximate cause of his falling
into the gutter and the consequent exposure, and it was for the jury to
find, whether the attack of pneumonia was the result of the exposure;
in other words, a continuous causation from the furnishing of the liquor."
This was a reasonable disposition to make of the case. The causal connection was shown, and the continuity of effect was traced through a
succession of events. If this case were decided with such a liberal and
fair-minded view, the plaintiff would rightly be non-suited. The defendant furnished liquor to an intoxicated man on the third of July, then
all trace of the man is lost for a day, and in a day the average or ordinary man will become sober enough to be held responsible, and alone be
liable for his acts. On the fourth of July the same man still drunk
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(how drunk?) runs over a child and kills it. Can it be said there is a
causal connection between the giving of the .liquor on the third and the
running over of the child an the fourth? We think not, nor do we think
the framers of the act intended that such elasticity should be read into
its provisions. The act imposes no higher degree of responsibility on the
liquor dealer than the common law imposes upon wrongdoers; 194 Pa. 24
supra.
The question of proximate cause is one for the jury; Temme v.
Schmidt, 210 Pa. 507; and we decide accordingly, because of public policy
and to prevent fraudulent consequences; and also because we do not believe such a broad statute was meant to be stretched to cover every possible case that might arise. This accident is not the proximate result of
the defendant's act.
The last question to be disposed of is that of contributory negligence.
It is well settled in Pennsylvania that contributory negligence cannot be
imputed to a child of tender years like the one in question: N. Pa. Ry.
Co. vs. Mahoney, 57 Pa. 187; Pittsbury Ry. Co. vs. Caldwell, 74 Pa. 421.
Woeckner v. Electric Motor Co., 176 Pa. 451; and a jury will not compel
him to use the care and precaution that it would an adult; but a child
who is left to run the street, must exercise such capacity as he has, and
this is a question for the jury. Rodgers v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475; Reinike v.
Phila Traction Co. 31 W. N. C. 471. The above statement imposes some
duty on the child and that duty varies with age and ability of the child.
We will not decide the question of care which a child must use; but suggest it in connection with the following: The child was in the street.
Hamilton, his father, was nearby and knew the child was in the street.
There is a number of cases which impute contributory negligence to the
parent, and bar his recovery under circumstances analogous to the
present case. Smith v. H. Pass. Ry. Co., 92 Pa. 450; Westerferg V.
Kinzua Creek etc. Ry. Co., 142 Pa. 471.
Although we have clearly shown that there was a right of action
against the defendant (Act of May 18, 1854), and that the father was entitled to be substituted and prosecute it to final judgment (Act of 1851,
April 15), yet, being the only distributee, he has lost his right of recovery
in this action by his contributory negligence.
We decide that the plaintiff cannot recovery first, because the furnishing of liquors is not the proximate cause within the meaning of the
statute; and secondly, because the recovery is barred by his contributory
negligence.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The words "injury to person" as used in the civil damage acts,
have been uniformly held to include actual physical violence or harm
sustained by a third person at the hands of the intoxicated person
whether this harm was intentionally or negligently inflicted. 13 Cyc.
313.
The learned Court below admits this general principle but contends
that there can be no recovery in the present case because (1) the sale of
liquor by the defendant was not the proximate cause of the injury to the
child; (2) the father was guilty of contributory negligence.
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The courts of Pennsylvania have adopted the rule which prevails in
most jurisdictions, and hold that there can be no recovery under the civil
damage acts unless the unlawful sale was the proximate cause of the injury. Fink v. Garman, 40 Pa. 95; Davies v. McKnight, 146 Pa. 610;
Taylor v. Wright, 125 Pa. 617; Temme v. Schmidt, 210 Pa. 507.
The question whether or not the sale by the defendant was the
proximate cause of the injury depends upon (1) the relation of the sale
to the intoxication; and (2) the relation of the intoxication to the injury.
The position taken by the learned court below is to the effect that there
was not such a relation between the sale of the liquor by the defendant
and the intoxication of Jackson on the fourth of July as to render the
injury to the child the proximate consequence of the defendant's act.
The learned court below seems to have been of the opinion that the
sale of liquor on July 3rd. could not have contributed to Jackson's intoxication on July 4th. In this opinion we cannot concur. It may be
true that in the great majority of cases a man will become sober within
a day, but this court is not prepared to announce as a rule of law that
this is always true. On the contrary the court believes that there may
be cases in which it is not true, and that whether it is true in any case is
peculiarly a question of fact for the jury and not of law for the court.
This is especially true in the present case where it appears that the
vendee of the liquor was "still drunk" on the following day and there is
no evidence that any liquor was consumed by him in the interim. The
question whether the liquor furnished by the defendant contributed to
the intoxication during which the injury was inflicted upon the child,
should have been submitted to the jury with the instruction that the fact
that the defendant did not furnish all of the liquor which caused the intoxication during which the injury was inflicted, was not a defence, if
the liquor furnished by the defendant contributed to the intoxication
which caused the injury complained of. Elkin v. Buschner, 1 Mona. 359.
Taylor v. Wright, 126 Pa. 617.
In an action brought for the benefit of a child who has sustained injuries, through the conduct of another, negligence on the part of the
child's parents will not be imputed to the child so as to bar a recovery by
him. Erie R. R. v. Schuster, 113 Pa. 413; P. R. R. v. James, 81J Pa. 194;
R. R. v. Mahoney, 57 Pa. 157; Smith v. O'Conner, 48 Pa. 218.
On the other hand when the action is by the parent in his own right,
the contributory negligence of the parent is a bar to the action. Erie
R. R. v. Schuster, 113 Pa. 413; Glassey v. Hestonville, 57 Pa. 172; Pa.
Co. v. Bock, 93 Pa. 427; Smith v. Hestonville, 92 Pa. 450; 29 Cyc. 555
and cases there cited. P. R. R. v. James, 81J Pa. 194. Consequently it is
held that the negligence of a parent proximately contributing to the
death of a child, will bar an action by the parent for the death of the
child. 18 L, R. A. N. S. 329; Cress v. P. & R. R. R., 228 Pa. 482; Westerberg v. R. R., 142 Pa. 471. Such are the "analogous" cases relied
upon by the learned court below.
The doctrine of these cases is not determinative of the case at bar.
The present action is not one for damages for the death of the child but
for the pain and suffering of the child during its life. If the child had
lived he could have recovered and upon his death after such recovery the
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parent would undoubtedly have been entitled to the money as sole distributee. The present action by the father is simply a continuation of
the action by the child and the same defences which would have been
available against the son, and no others, should be available against the
son's administrator. It has therefore been held that the contributory
negligence of a parent is not a defence where the parent sues as administrator for damages for the pain and suffering of a deceased child
during life. St. Louis R. R. v. Dawson, 68 Ark. 1, 56 S. W. 46.
If the father's contributory negligence is held to be a bar
to the present suit, it would also be a bar to a suit in all cases
where the father was the sole distributee, whether the father or
same one else was itdministrator. In every suit continued by the
child's administrator, the court would be compelled to ascertain the
number of the child's distributees and which of these had been guilty of
contributory negligence. The court would also have to ascertain whether
or not the child had any debts, for, the contributory negligence of the
child's distributees, should not prejudice the child's creditors. The inconvenience of the principle enunciated by the learned court below leads
us to believe that it would not be adopted by the courts of Pennsylvania.
Whatever the rule in Pennsylvania on this point may be, we are not
prepared to say that a parent who allows his seven year old child to play
in the street, is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Whether or not such conduct on the part of the parent constitutes contributory negligence is a question for the jury, in the decision of which
the character of the street, and the environment of the parent, must be
considered.
It has been held that it is not contributory negligence as a matter of
law for parents to permit a child three years old to go into a road to
play, accompanied by a sister of eight, although there is a street car
track in the road and the grade is steep (Murray v. Scranton R. Co., 36
Super. Ct. 576), or to permit a child of four years to go upon the streets
in charge of a brother, eleven years old (Distasis v. United Trac. Co.,
35 Sup. 406), or to allow a boy of seven to run around by himself on the
streets (Henderson v. Co., 219 Pa. 384), or to allow children of four and
eight years to play upon the side walk (Addis v. Hess, 23 Super. Ct. 505),
or to allow a child of nine years to ride velocipede upon the puplic street
(Phillips v. Duquesne Trac. Co., 8 Sup. Ct. 210). See Smith v. Hestoinville R. R., 82 Pa. 453.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

COX'S ESTATE.
Liability of Surety on Trustee's Bond.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Taylor is trustee of Cox's estate. The surety on his bond after ten
years from time of becoming surety, was discharged, and another bond
with surety was accepted by the Orphan's Court, with the consent of
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the cestui que trust. After several years a defalcation of the trustee occuring prior to the giving of the new bond, is discovered of $10,000.
is an action against the surety on the new bond.
Mendelsohn for Plaintiff.
O'Brien for Defendant.

This

OPINION OF THE COURT.
WARRINGTON, J.-The sole question appearing upon the facts set
forth by the plaintiff, is whether a surety on a trustees bond is liable
for the defalcation of the trustee, occurring prior to the giving of the
bond and surety..
The learned counsel for the defendant in this case, failed to appear
and has not since filed any brief br set up any defence to this action, but
it appears obligatory upon us to consider the case; therefore we will
consider the different defences that might have been set up by the defendant, to ascertain whether such defences would be sufficient in law
to defeat this cause of action and justify us in rendering a judgment in
favor of the defendant.
The first question which we will consider is, was there such evidence offered as would relieve the defendant of his liability on the bond.
We agree that if there had been a fraudulent concealment by the
Orphans Court or cestui que trust that Taylor, the trustee, was a
defaulter at the time the defendant became his security, and was
accepted by the Orphans Court and cestui que trust, such concealment
would have been a ground of relief in favor of the defendant, for fraud
vitiates and avoids all contracts, but there was no proof or offer of proof
of such acts on part of the court and cestui que trust.
The only fact appearing from the facts as set forth was that plaintiff
had not exercised due diligence and care in respect to the truth. Plaintiff had no actual notice of the defaults of the trustee until years after
he became surety, and we are unable to find any rule imposing upon the
obligee under a bond the positive duty to investigate with a view to inform the surety in the absence of any inquiry by him to do so. Had
such a request been made and it had been denied or evaded, a different
question might have been presented; but it was not. Neither the court
nor the cestui que trust knew or had reason to suspect, so far as it appears, the defalcation afterwards discovered. Unless, therefore, some
rule of diligence be applied to such a case, creating a positive duty on
the part of the obligee to investigate the accounts of the trustee as often
as they are about to give security for future fidelity for the purpose of
disclosing his status unasked to their proposed sureties, unsuspecting
confidence or ordinary negligence will not be sufficient to visit an obligee
with a loss of his security.
In Rollen v. Mulhearn 10 C. & T. 934, the question was as to whether defendants were to be affected with the non-communication of material facts within their knowledge, if they did not conceal them
with a view to their own personal advantage. Held "the mere noncommunication of circumstances affecting the intention of the parties
material for the surety to be acquainted with, and within the knowledge of the person obtaining a surety bond, is undue concealment,
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though not wilful or intentional or with a view to any advantage to himself." The case turned on the withholding of those material facts, known
to the obligees from the surety
In the case at bar we should have to go further, and say that the
obligee takes the risk of such facts, whether they be known or not. In
1 Don. 272, it is held if an agent has been guilty of embezzlement or
other improper conduct unknown to his employee, the surety would be
liable; that where a defalcation is unknown to such holder, although it
may exist, the surety will be liable.
We think that there is not a shadow of doubt that the surety on the
trustee's bond is liable and is not relieved by any facts appearing which
tend to show fraud on the part of the obligees; such as would vitiate his
obligations.
In Com. v. Cox's Admr., 36 Pa. 442, there were three sureties on
a guardian's bond and ten years after the giving of the first bond on
which plaintiffs for use were sureties; in accordance with an order of
court the guardian gave another bond with defendant as surety. Judgment was rendered against the sureties on the first bond for the sum of
$5,032.61 the amount in which guardian was in default. It appeared
that he was in default more than half of this amount before the giving
of second bond. Held that the sureties in the second bond were equally
liable and bound for the full performance of the duties of this trust by
the principal with the sureties in the original bond; therefore they were
liable for the defanit of the principal accruing any time during the administration of his duties as guardian.
Upon the limited facts as set forth in the case, and the law as laid
down by the cases reported, we think the defendant is liable for the sum
of $10,000, the defalcation of the trustee. It may be, and we think it
very likely, that should such a case arise, the defendant would be entitled to compensation from the first surety to the amount of one-half of
the defalcation; hut as this question does not affect the judgment in this
case, we will not consider it at any length.
Judgment for plaintiff for $10,000 and costs.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The misappropriation of funds by the trustee having occurred prior
to the giving of the bond upon which the defendant was a surety, the
question presented for our consideration is whether or not the surety is
responsible for defaults which occurred before he became surety.
The authorities upon this subject are not entirely harmonious. In a
number of cases the surety has been held liable for such defaults. Ladd
v. Smith (Ala.) 10 So. 836; State v. Howarth 48 Conn. 207. The same
rule has been asserted in reference to the liability of a surety on a guardian's or administrator's or executor's bond. 4 American and English
Ann. Cas. 345: 11 A. & E. Eng. 881. 15 A. & E. Eng. 119. and cases
cited. The decisions in some of these cases were based upon the wording
of the particular bond; in others upon statutory provisions; and in others
upon the principle that it is the duty of the fiduciary to make a true
account and that this duty is covered by the substituted bond- 4 Amer.
Eng. Ann. Cas. 345. 15 A. & E. 115.
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On the other hand it has been held that where the substituted bond
of a trustee does not expressly or by fair implication stipulate for liability for past misconduct on the part of the trustee, the surety is liable
only for defaults of the trustee which occur after its execution. Lamar
v. Walton (Ga.) 27 S. E. 715; Statev. Hunter, (Conn.)47 Atl. 665; Statev.
Banks (Md.) 24 Atl. 415. This doctrine has also been asserted by some
courts in referenre to the lability of a surety upon a guardian's bond.
4 Amer. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 345; 13 A. & E. 119.
In this conflict of authority a resort to principle may be helpful. As
a matter of principle it cannot be doubted that the surety should not be
held liable. As was well said in Sebastian v. Bryan, 21 Ark. 447, "In
absence of any statute extending the liability of sureties on a bond, it
ought to begin only with their undertaking, as such must be supposed to
have been their intention."
It is well settled that a surety is entitled to stand upon the letter of
his contract, and that his understanding is to be construed strictly in his
favor and is not to be extended by inference or implication beyond the
fair scope of its terms. It has also been held that a contract of suretyship is not ordinarily to be construed as retroactive so as to render the
surety liable for prior default. 27 A. & E. 442. This rule is applied both
to ordinary cases of suretyship and to sureties on official bonds and no
good reason is discovered why a different rule should be applied to a
surety on a trustee's bond.
It certainly is not the understanding of ordinary men when they become sureties on a bond that they render themselves liable for defaults
which occur prior to the execution of the bond. Their belief undoubtedly
is that the bond is prospective and covers future defaults only.
The cestui is not without a remedy for the defaults of the trustee.
The sureties on the old bond remain liable for all defaults of the trustees
committed before the new bond is approved. Act of June 1st 1907, P.
L. 384.
In rendering judgment for the plaintiff the learned court below has
relied upon the decision in C. v. Cox, 36 Pa. 442. Though the facts of
this case are not exactly similar to those of the case at bar, it cannot be
denied that the cases should be governed by the same principle, and, in
view of the conflict which exists in other jurisdictions, there can be no
doubt that the Pennsylvania courts would apply the doctrine of the Cox
case to the facts of the present case and render judgment for the
plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.

STEEL v. KURTZ.
ight of Posthumous Child to Sue for Death of Father-Statute
of Limitation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
This is an action by John Steel, an infant, by his next friend, against
William Kurtz, for negligently causing the death of his father. Two
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weeks after the father's death the plaintiff was born. His mother died
when he was born. His mother brought no action against the defendant
but her executor contends that he is the proper one to sue. Suit was
brought within a year after the child's birth, but more than a year since
his father's death.
Routh for plaintiff.
Burd for defendaut.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MILLER, J.-Three questions arise in this case. First: Does any
right to sue accrue to a posthumous child, after its entry into the
world, for an act which occurred during the period of its mother's
pregnancy? Secondly, is the child concluded by the mother, or her executor or administrator from bringing suit? Thirdly, if mother be capable of suing wvhen the action accrues, does the statute of limitations
run against the child?
The English common law gave a posthumaus child the right to sue
upon birth. Blackstone in Vol. I, p. 130* states, that life is an immediate
gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual and it begins
in contemplation of the law as soon as it is able to stir in its mother's
womb and it takes property by descent immediately upon its birth.
The child in the case at bar was undoubtedly in straight succession
as heir, and 13 Cyc. 331) tells us that "a child in utero is considered in being and may claim compensation for death to its relatives, though such
death occurred while the infant was in ventre sa mere." 5 S.& R. 38;
85 Pa. 339; 3 C. C. R. 212.
We now answer the question does a right of action under the case
survive to the child. The common law maxim was, "actio personalis
moritur cum persong," hence no action would be brought for negligence
resulting in death. However, by a series of legislation Pennsylvania has
changed'the old rule and the 19th Sec. of Act of April 15. 1851, provides
that whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit be brought by the person injured during his or her life,
the widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal
representative may maintain an action, and recover damages for the death
thus occasioned." This was the law until the passage of Act of April
26th, 1855, which provides that the persons entitled to recover damages
shall be the husband, widow, children or parents, of deceased and no
other relatives. This act repealed nothing in Act of 1851, except that
right of action was taken away from the personal representative of deceased. 45 Pa. 158.
Justice Fell in 193 Pa., 339 says that the Act of April 26th, 1855,
designates the persons who may exercise the right conferred by Sec. 19
of the Act of 1851. Taylor's Estate, 179 Pa. 254. Maher v. Phila.
Traction Co.. 181 Pa. 341.
Under the above Acts, where a widow recovers damages for death
of husband, the children of deceased are entitled to share in the amount
recovered as in case of intestacy, 84 Pa. 419. In order that the record
may disclose who the beneficiaries are, it is provided in 2nd Sec. of Act
of 1855 that "the declaration shall state who are the parties entitled in
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such action."
This principle is firmly fixed, but the real question is, if
the widow does not bring suit, are the children who are next in line excluded by the rights of their mother, or in case of her death by the
rights of her executor or administrator from suing?
While 204 Pa. 229 holds that a widow in an action of damages for
death of husband must be plaintiff, we think the case was so decided
from the fact that the widow endeavored to assign her rights to her
child before the verdict, so as to enable the action to be brought in her
name for the use of the child, and a claim such as hers is not assignable.
Rice v. Stuart, 83 Mass. 566. Surely she could not assign her claim to
third parties and cut off all equities of her children and though in this
case her motives were good, the act being contrary to law her intention
could not be sustained.
210 Pa. 367 may be distinguished from the case at bar, for if the
widow cannot recover, prima facie the children cannot, and as they
may not be joined as party plaintiffs, 13 W. N. C. 339, they certainly
have no right, on a judgment against plaintiff to appeal. The Court says
nothing of a case in which the widow dies or refuses to bring suit.
To say that the right of suit of the widow is a chose in action and
hence must pass to her heir, -is beside the point and circulusin probando.
It is to prove that no right of iction survives to children by the uncertain premise that they never had a right of suit.
Yet, regardless of what tha law might be-there being no decisions
on all fours in Pennsylvania-it would indeed be an iniquitous ruling
which would prohibit the children from suing, if the widow or her personal representative refused to bring suit and it is doubtful if equity
would give any remedy.
Again Power's Appeal, 179 Pa. 531, states that the widow acts as a
kind of trustee for the children of the moneys obtained from suit, hence,
if the personal representative of deceased widow were the only one to
sue, the children would have thrust upon them a trustee, whom they
might not only not want, but who would actually be prejudicial to their
interests.
It seems to us when the law is inadequate, and a sort of lethargy has
crept over our legislature-they make no effort to remedy defective
legislation, it is highly competent for the Court to look to the equity of a
statute and to make by way of decision, some judicial legislation and then
let the legislature determine the constitutionality of the proceeding.
Justice Potter in 207 Pa. 113, by way of dictum says: "The suit might
have been carried to completion by the next friend or guardian of the
minor, the widow having died in infancy."
Is the child's right to sue barred by the Statute of Limitations?
Sec. II, Act Apr. 26, 1855, reads: "The action (referring to Act Apr. 26,
1855 Sec. 1, stated above) shall be brought within one year after the
death and not thereafter."
The general proposition is that when a right is created by statute
the language of the statute is conclusive as to that right. Thus it is a
well settled principle that "a saving from the operation of statute for
disabilities must be expressed, or it does not exist."
173 Pa. 536. 31
W. N. C. 251, the only case in Pennsylvania on the subject, states that
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"limitation of one year is not barred by the fact that plaintiff was an
infant at the time of the death of the person by negligence for the limitations contains no exceptions in favor of infants."
While it may seem rather paradoxical that a posthumous child, as in
this case, is considered as in being and given a right to sue for the death
of a parent, and then to hold that the Statute of Limitations does not
run against it until it is born, yet this is true. 48 N. Y. Suppl. 36. Infancy is no bar to the State, but the one Pennsylvania case on the subject says nothing about a posthumous- child, and a child in ventre sa mere
within the above meaning is not an infant. 11 L. R. A. 391, a Texas
case, on material points is on all fours with the case at hand and holds
that the Statute of Limitations does not run against a child until it is
born. 97 Iowa 91.
In 34 Pa. 419 suit was brought by a widow within one year, but a
posthumous child was not joined until after a year from the death of the
deceased, held, (though it made a material difference in the amount of
damages) "that the limitation has no application to the subsequent
amendment of the declaration."
Thus it might be argued from analogy
the Statute of Limitations would not run against a posthumous child as
in this case.
Judgment for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The second section of the act of April 26th, 1855 is very specific. It
provides that an action for death by wrongful act shall be brought
"within one year after the death and not thereafter." Construing this
section, it has been held that infants are subject to this limitation.
Lannurg v. Penn Co. 31 W. N. C. 251. The contention that the limitation did not apply to infants was ably presented by the counsel in this
case who claimed that their position was "reasonable, for it cannot be
supposed that the legislature intended to render the rights of children
dependent upon the activity and intelligence of the mother. They cannot sue for themselves; they cannot compel anyone to sue for them, and
no one is liable over in case the children lose their action. This is not
like a case in which trustee neglects to bring an action for his cestui for
until an action is brought there is no cestui." Nevertheless the court
sustained a demurrer to the declaration saying, "You are asking us.to
insert into the act a provision which is not there." The decision of the
court is in accord with the authorities in other jurisdictions, 13 Cyc. 340.
With knowledge of these principles and conscious of the inconsistency
of its position, the learned court below has decided that the present action is not barred by the statute of limitations because a year has not
elapsed since the birth of John Steel, although a year has elapsed since
the death of John Steel's father for whose death the action is brought.
As a justification for its decision the learned court below relies upon
an alleged analogy found in Huntingdon R. R. v. Decker, 84 Pa. 419, and
a Texas case reported in 11 L. R. A. 391. A careful examination of
Huntingdon R. R. v. Decker fails to discover any analogue to the present
case. It simply decides that where the widow has brought suit within a
year, the court may, after the expiration of a year from the death, but
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before trial, allow the declaration to be amended by naming the children
as jointly entitled to damages. The reason given for this decision was
not that the statute of limitation did not apply to infants but that it did
not apply to amendments. Neither of the children was posthumous.
In Nelson v. G. & H. R. L. (Texas) 11 L. R. A. 391, it is held that
the fact that the statutory period of one year has elapsed since the death
of the father does not bar an action by a posthumous child. The terms
of the Texas statute are not set forth in the opinion of the court, but it
seems that the action for death by wrongful act was governed by a "general law of limitation" which contained a provision that the statute
should not run against an infant until the removal of his disability.
Moreover, under the Texas statute the children were given a right to
sue for and recover the value of their father's life. As their right to
sue was independent of that of their mother, the fact that the mother
was capable of suing at the time of the father's beath, did not cause the
statute to run against the children's right. The decision was not based
upon the principle that the limitation did uot apply to posthumouschildren, but upon the principle that it did not apply to children.
In Pennsylvania the statute of limitations is specific; it is directed
against the cause of action and not against the action when brought by
certain beneficiaries; and it applies to infants. The widow, if she survives, is alone entitled to sue and during her life the children have no independent right to sue.
The Texas case is, therefore, not determinative of the present case.
We find additional justification for our refusal to follow it in the fact that
the Superior and Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania have refused to follow
other decisions of the Texas court construing the statute giving an action for death by wrongful act. Shambach v. Middlecreek E. Co., 45
Super. Ct. 300.
It may be argued that the principle here asserted will sometimes
result in hardship. Hardship is always the result of the application of
the statute of limitations to a just claim. Hardship may also result
from the fact that the statute runs against an infant born prior to
father's death; from the fact that the mother may compromise the infant's claim; and from the fact that the motherhaving recovered may refuse to pay the children their share of the money.
The interests of the children are to some extent committed to the
mother and, as a rule, she will prove a careful and faithful trustee. If,
as claimed, such commission is fraught with evil and liable to abuse, the
remedy is in the legislature and not the courts.
Judgment Reversed.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
GRAUPNER, J.-In this case one of the questions seems to hinge
on whether the alleged deceased died on the day of his disappearance or
whether he lived after notice had been sent to his home to pay'his dues
and assessments where he last lived. It is very evident that the plaintiff
in this case could recover the amount she is sueing for if it could be
shown that the missing one had really died on or about the date of his
disappearance before the expiration of the limited time set for the paying of his dues and assessments. And if the defendants in this case
could show that the missing one was alive one month after sending the
notice of his arrearages, there would be no question that the membership and the obligation to pay anything at his death would cease. But
we are unwilling to base our opinion on this question, since we are unable to find any evidence of the exact date of the presumed dead one's
death. The fact that the missing one was absent from. his last home
and not heard of for over seven years would naturally raise the presumption of his death, this being the legal time set for a presumption of death.
Now, then, we are of opinion that the one question which this case
should be decided on, is whether the presumed dead one died before the
expiration of one month after the notice was sent for the payment of
his dues and assessments or whether he died after the expiration of the
limited time set for paying his dues and assessments. But since this is
an impossible question for a court to decide owing to the lack of evidence
we cannot base our opinion on this point.
In Hancock v. The American Life Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 26, it has been
held: "When one is known to be alive at a certain time there is a presumption of the continuance of his life after that period which must be
overcome by some sort of proof." The question raised by the attorney
for defendants, -When did he die?" is one which cannot be answered
by the court, it being one of fact which must be submitted to a jury.
Jacobs v. The Baltimore Mutual Aid Sosiety, 9 Sup. 99. In absence of
any evidence to show when the presumed dead one died, we are of opinion
that the question is whether or not the plaintiff can base her claim on
the fact that the "Ancient Order of United )&orkmen" in its agreement
with Kerper, will have to pay her the death benefits under the circumstances, which are, that the defendants promised to pay the widow at
his death certain benefits provided he pays certain dues and assessments monthly aud if any of these remain unpaid for a month after notice his membership and obligation to pay anything at his death were to
to cease.
It has been held in The Passenger Conductors' Life Ins. Co. v. Birnbaum, 116 Pa. 595: "Where the right to benefits is conditioned on the
payment of assessments a failure to pay such assessments is a forfeiture
of the benefits."
Where a certificate of a beneficial association provides that a failure
to pay any assessments within a certain specified time shall render the
certificate null and void, time is of the essence of the contract and a
failure to pay within the designated time will render the certificate void.
Dickinson v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 159 Pa. 258.
In this ease Kerper's dues and assessments had not been paid and
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according to his certificate he thereby became ipso facto expelled, the
condition being that if any member failed to pay after a given notice,
his membership and the defendant's obligation to pay anything were to
cease.
Where the by-laws of a beneficial association disclose that a member
becomes non-beneficial if he does not pay assessments at given times, no
question of notice is involved and it becomes the duty of the member to
keep himself advised whether or not he is in arrears for assessments.
A failure to exercise this duty will subject him to the risk of becoming
non-beneficial. Rhule v. Diamond Colliery Accidental Fund, 13 Sup.
417.
Because of the failure to show just when Kerper died and because of
the nonpayment of the dues and assessments which, according to agreement, were to be paid after notice had been given that they were overdue, we are of opinion that the plaintiff has no right of recovery.
Judgment for defendants.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
By the terms of the agreement existing between Kerper and the association, the wife's right to recover was conditioned upon (1) the death
of Kerper; (2) his payment of dues, assessments, etc., within one month
after notice.
The wife contends that these conditions have been fulfilled because
(1) Kerper having been absent and unheard of for seven years, a presumption of death arises and that this presumption has not been rebutted; (2) the presumption is that Kerper died at the time of his disappearance and that therefore no assessments, etc., remain unpaid, and
that even if this were not so, the notice given of the assessment accruing after Kerper's disappearance was not a sufficient notice upon which
to base a forfeiture.
The rule that when a person has been absent and unheard of for
seven years, a presumption of death arises, is a part of the law of Pennsylvania. Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150; Mutual Benefit Ass'n's Petition,
194 Pa. 1; Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Wharton 173.
Though there is a considerable conflict of authority elsewhere as to
the time when the death will be presumed to have occurred, the Pennsylvania courts have uniformly held that the death is presumed to have occurred at the expiration of seven years and not at the time of disappearance. Burr v. Sim, 4 Whar. 150; Mutual Benefit Ass'n's Petition 174
Pa. 1; Rhodes Est. 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 386.
Since it is admitted that dues and assessments which became due between the time of Kerper's disappeaaance and the time of bringing suit,
remain unpaid, the widow cannot recover unless the notice given by the
company was insufficient.
It has been held that where notice of assessment is required without
any qualifications as to manner, the notice must be personal and actually
received by the member before it becomes bindingupon him. Courteney
v. Ass'n (Iowa), 53 N. W. 238; McCorkle v. Ass'n, 71 Tex. 140; 8 S.
W. 516; Cooley's Briefs on the Law of Insurance, vol. 3, p. 2357, and
cases there cited; 3 A. & E. ency. 1099, Watchel v. Society, 84 N. Y. 28.
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Protection Co. v. Palmer, 81 Ill. 94; Taggart v. Ass'n, S Pa. Co. Ct.
336.
In Courteney v. U. S. Ass'n (Iowa) 53 N. W. 238, it was held that
if an insured was ill at the time a letter containing a notice was brought
from the postoffice to his residenze, and unable to understand or transact any business, and so remained until his death, before which time the
letter was not opened, there was not a sufficient notice. The obligation
to pay the assessment did not attach.until actual notice was given.
The inability of the Association in Courteney v. Ass'n, to give actual notice to the insured did not, however, result from the voluntary
act of the insured, and counsel for the plaintiff contended merely that
the association had assumed the "hazard of any event, not caused by
the voluntary act of the insured, that would prevent it from giving
notice."
In the present case the inability of the association to give actual
notice arose from the voluntary act of the insured, to wit, his change
of residence without notice to his wife or the company of his new place
of residence. It might be argued that there is nothing to show that
Kerper's disappearance was not due to his death and his death being
presumably involuntary, the case falls within the principle of Courteney
v. Ass'n. The answer to this argument would be that if Kerper's
death had caused his disappearance no question of notice would be involved. There is no proof, however, as to the time of Kerper's death
and the plaintiff having invoked the presumption of death must abide by
the terms of that presumption.
In Wachtel v. Soc., 83 N. Y. 28 it was held that a member of a
beneficial association was under no obligation to give notice to the company of his change of residence, but the fact that a by-law provided a
specific penalty for a failure to notify the association of a change of
residence, was one of the considerations which influenced the court to so
decide.
Considering the case from a standpoint of practical common sense,
this court has no difficulty in deciding that if the insured by his voluntary act has rendered it impossible for the association to give him actual notice, and the association has given the only notice possible under
the circumstances, the notice should be held to be sufficient.
The rule requiring actual notice has not been invariably applied in
Pennsylvania. Lockney v. Ass'n, 217 Pa. 573, is authority for the proposition that a member's rights may sometimes be forfeited for non payment of assessments though he received no actual notice of such assessments.
If the rule is not an inexorable rule; if the court may make exceptions to the rule, there can be no doubt that the present case furnishes
an ideal situation for the creation of an exception.
Judgment affirmed.

